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Abstract
This paper critiques the usefulness of cognitive-behavioural therapy, which is often seen as a means of
redressing the loss of community and friendship networks within society. Therapy in this context they runs the
danger of becoming an Iatrogenesis at worst and just another `technology of mood’ at best. In this paper we develop
the critiques made elsewhere and provide a more nuanced argument that considers a wider range of psychological
therapies. While all psychological therapies operate at an individual level, there are wide differences in the
epistemological stances taken by differing therapeutic schools. Cognitive-behavioural therapy focuses on the idea of
dysfunctional thinking within the individual, psychoanalytic therapy focuses upon developmental legacies, whereas
person-centred therapy focuses on currently active social influences. In this form one to one therapy can be a route
to change which is compatible with our sociological critique. However, the broader criticism that psychological
therapies attempt to compensate for breakdowns in friendship and social networks remains. Furthermore reviews of
psychotherapeutic outcome data and qualitative enquiry both point to the experience of authentic relationship rather
than psychotherapeutic technique as the major determinant of outcome. Preventing social dislocation rather than
trying to repair it post hoc should be the goal. This would beg a wider range of questions such as; what does social
isolation actually mean in contemporary western society and what does this mean for people with mental health
problems in particular? What are the various ways in which social networks provide support functions and what may
be missing in an individual’s life and then what can be done to try and compensate for that lack?
Introduction
The study of happiness gathered new momentum a decade ago
when the economist Richard Layard proposed that Governments
should focus policy on the pursuit of happiness rather than wealth
[1,2]. Layard’s analysis revealed that, in general, happiness in western
countries including the UK had not increased despite significant
increases in GDP since the end of World War II. Although increasing
income boosts happiness for those living in poverty, Layard found this
relationship breaks down once a certain level of National wealth is
achieved [2]. Comparison of happiness across countries reveals that
once incomes reach around US$20,000 per capita, increased wealth
has no impact on aggregate happiness. Work by Wilkinson also shows
that increases in income at above this level has little impact upon
improvements in health, and that societies then need to focus upon
service access and leveling inequalities for health gain [3]. As a
consequence, Layard encouraged the adoption of the underlying
philosophic principle, promoted originally by Jeremy Bentham and the
`Utilitarian School’ that society should aim at producing the greatest
possible sum total of happiness [4].
In this paper, we will provide an overview of these developments,
followed by a critical sociological analysis which points to limitations
and future directions for policy and practice.
Happiness Research and its Implications for Policy and
Practice
Layard reports seven factors that large scale surveys have identified




• work and job security;
• community and friends;
• health;
• personal freedom (essentially civil liberties); and
• Values (a religious or spiritual aspect to life).
When the impacts of these are measured qualitatively, the factors
that have the largest negative impact on happiness are marriage
breakdown, becoming unemployed, perceived poor health and low
personal freedom (in that order).
Layard argues that this helps to explain why increased wealth has
not improved happiness in society. In the same period that average
wealth has doubled, marriage breakdown has increased significantly.
Community trust has decreased [5], job security has been sacrificed in
favour of increased productivity and lower unit costs and self-
perceptions of health and wellbeing have plummeted as people are
flooded with media images of perfection. Furthermore, once above the
US$20,000 per capita income it is wealth relative to peers that counts,
not absolute wealth [2]. One of the greatest impacts of this is on
taxation policy. Traditionally taxation has been seen as a distorting
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influence, so carrying an assumption that lower tax is always desirable
and therefore requiring a high level of justification. However, Layard
shows that higher incomes work against happiness at a societal level in
two main ways. The first is related to rivalry. If one person’s income
increases, their happiness increases, but that of their peers decreases by
up to one-third as much because relatively, their peers are now worse
off. The second is what Layard calls habituation. That is, the increase
in happiness from a rise in income reduces over time as people get
used to the new living standard. For example, a new mobile phone
resulted in significant happiness in 1992 but now only a 4G IPhone 6
will do it. This habituation is unforeseen and therefore, he argues,
results in much wasted expenditure. Layard estimates that up to 30 per
cent of increases in income are placed in `over-investment’ in material
possessions.
Layard’s conclusion is that taxation is therefore corrective, not
distorting. This is a fundamental challenge to conventional thinking.
According to these approximate numbers, a top marginal taxation rate
of 60 per cent would be a ‘neutral’ figure. It is, in fact, the typical
marginal tax rate in Europe, where happiness is generally greater than
in the US or Britain. The decreasing positive impact of increases of
wealth on happiness also suggests a strongly progressive taxation
system. This is reinforced by the work of Hutton and others who
illustrate the concerns that people have about the disintegration of
social values when public services begin to run down in low tax
regimes [6]. Comparisons are made by Hutton between levels of
concern about public squalor in the USA with its run down public
services and in Europe where services have been largely maintained.
The clear implication is that happiness is positively associated with
public service provision.
There is much in Layard’s broader arguments that are attractive, in
particular that the underlying thrust of Layard’s argument seems to
critique individualistic competitive society and is effectively arguing
for a new form of welfarism. However, Layard’s focus for a happier
society is not upon structural change or with a reordering of the highly
competitive liberal capitalist economic system (despite his critique of
consumer culture) or even with a re-establishment of community, but
rather upon therapy and how we think about ourselves.
In these terms, Layard has suggested the need for an additional
10,000 new clinical psychologists and psychological therapists to be
trained in order that depression, anxiety, and schizophrenia in the
United Kingdom can be treated according to the standards of national
evidence based guidelines. As Shaw and Taplin report [7] these
proposals initially met with mixed and critical reaction but were then
endorsed and enacted by Government. The main critique of this paper
is that such strong a commitment to expanding CBT and other
evidence based psychological approaches individualises wider social
issues. Furthermore operationalization of these proposals also
threatens a reification of the notion of community support by
replacing it with contact with therapists.
Therapy as a Pathway to Happiness
Jeremy Bentham’s “greatest good of the greatest number”, has been
critiqued before. For Marx, a productive inquiry had to investigate
what sorts of things are good for people — that is, what are our true
natures, alienated under capitalism. Second, Marx argues that human
nature is dynamic, so the concept of a single utility for all humans is
one-dimensional and not useful [8]. Interestingly Pope John Paul 2
had a similar view "Utilitarianism is a civilization of production and of
use, a civilization of things and not of persons, a civilization in which
persons are used in the same way as things are used” [9]. We also have
concerns over Layard’s adoption of Benthamite principles. A major
feature of his proposals has been to encourage the availability of
psychological therapies as a way of resolving unhappiness and
improving economic efficiency. As a result, largely of his influence,
considerable NHS investment has been committed to providing an
unprecedented increase in available, publically funded therapists in the
form of the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPTs)
programme. The initiative has been based upon a pair of related
assumptions: first, that unhappiness and disability is associated with
mental health problems and can be viewed as the result of one or other
of a set of discrete conditions and second, that appropriate
psychological therapy can be an effective way of treating such
conditions, and therefore reversing unhappiness and alleviating
related disability.
The IAPTs programme began in 2006 with demonstration sites in
Doncaster and Newham, focusing on improving access to
psychological therapies services for adults of working age. In 2007, the
Department of Health published an implementation plan which
committed the government to £33 million in 2008/09, a further £70
million in 2009/10 and a further £70 million in 2010/11 [9]. This
money was to be used by NHS commissioning authorities to fund
distinct provider organisations offering unprecedented access to
psychological treatments. By 31 March 2011, 142 of the 151 Primary
Care Trusts in England had a service from this programme in at least
part of their area and just over 50 per cent of the adult population had
access. 3,660 new cognitive behavioural therapy workers had been
trained, and over 600,000 people started treatment. Over 350,000
completed it, over 120,000 moved to recovery and over 23,000 came
off sick pay or benefits (between October 2008 and 31 March 2011
[10]. This final claim reflects an important feature of the rhetoric
encouraging the Exchequer to make such a commitment. In 2004
Layard had been able to claim that “there are now more mentally ill
people drawing incapacity benefits than there are unemployed people
on Jobseeker’s Allowance” [1]. In 2007 Oxford Economics reported
that “in 2006 there were nearly one million recipients of Incapacity
Benefit due to mental and behavioural disorders. This is 40% of total
Incapacity Benefit recipients. This is similar to the total number of
unemployment benefits claims in the UK [11]. On the basis of such
figures and results from the IAPT Demonstration sites, it was
estimated that the programme could save the NHS up to £272million
and the wider public sector would benefit by more than £700 million: a
good return on an initial investment of £173 million. The proposal
suggested that a programme of improved access to psychological
therapies would result in considerable savings on welfare benefits costs
and, given the reasonable assumption that unresolved mental health
difficulties are a significant source of unhappiness, it would also make
a considerable contribution to the “greatest good of the greatest
number”.
Unfortunately this promise is not being realised. Five years after
initiation of the IAPT programme, mental health difficulties remain
one of the most common reasons for sickness-related welfare benefits
[12] and the rate at which NHS practitioners are prescribing anti-
depressants has continued its inexorable rise. In England, some 25
million prescriptions for a course of antidepressants were issued in
2000. That figure had risen to nearly 40 million by 2009 [13], and it
has continued to rise at a rate of some 10% per annum [14]. What is
more the percentage of incapacity Benefit claimants with mental
health problems has not decreased either [15]. At these levels of
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analysis, making therapy widely available does not appear to be
making a significant impact upon wellbeing. Therefore, it could be
argued that Layard’s assumptions: that unhappiness and disability
associated with mental health problems can be viewed as the result of
one or other set of discrete conditions, and that appropriate
psychological therapy can be an effective way of treating the condition
and therefore reversing unhappiness and alleviating related disability,
are flawed. We believe that they are based upon a mistaken
oversimplification of the relationships between mental health
difficulties, therapy, disability and happiness which deserves
clarification.
A distinctly different field illustrates this complexity. More than a
century has passed since first publication of The Secret Garden by
Frances Burnett in 1911 [16]. The novel illustrates the consequences of
assumptions of disability and its limitations, and only indirect
associations between rigid medical and therapeutic conventions and
expectations, and personal outcome. Colin had been assumed a cripple
and consigned to a life of dependency and unhappiness. Relationship,
care, curiosity and a certain amount of ingenuity enable his
redemption, or in contemporary language, recovery. The intervening
century has seen great strides in change towards those with significant
physical disability, culminating in the celebration of triumph over
disability which was the theme of the London Para-Olympics of 2012.
Although many of those who took part, and those many more who live
fulfilled, happy and flourishing lives despite significant physical
disability may welcome and benefit from professional healthcare
support; none have achieved their recovery exclusively because of it.
Most importantly, their ability to achieve and flourish has not been
dependent upon, or waited for, effective “treatment” of their “illness”.
They have achieved autonomy and a measure of happiness in spite of
their disability. The New Economics Foundation have identified 5
alternative pathways to wellbeing – which are, `Connect; Be Active;
Take Notice; Keep Learning and Give’ which seem far more relevant to
improving people’s lives than the actions of therapists [17]. These
pathways are also used in the mental health recovery process by use of
music, dance and art as forms of therapy.
The journey taken by the Disability Rights Movement across the
twentieth century is one that could be usefully mirrored by a similar
approach to psychological difficulties. Important stages on that
journey have been normalisation, dissociation of the assumption that
one form of disability implies global disability, and assimilation of the
fact that recovery of autonomy and a measure of happiness are not
entirely dependent upon professional input. All of these are poorly
developed in the mental health field, and as result there is a large and
steadily growing number of unnecessarily disabled and unhappy
individuals who are trapped by their assumed status, in the same way
as Burnett’s Colin is trapped at the beginning of the story.
Mental health difficulties are troubling, not only to those suffering
but also to those around them. Distress, despair, fear, confusion or
anxiety provoking behaviour all evoke strong feelings amongst those
witnessing them, and sometimes people in such a state do behave in a
dangerous or reprehensible way. Therefore, it is not surprising, that
there is a long and continuous history of social distancing and
institutional sanction in response [18,19]. Indeed one of Jesus’ earlier
miracles was to cast out demons from a socially marginalised
madman. Confinement in one context or another was standard
practice until the middle of the twentieth century, and the power of a
label intimating a mental health difficulty remains considerable.
Stigma and other forms of social exclusion are commonplace.
Amongst these are adverse experiences in the workplace, social
settings, relationships, health-care facilities and at the hands of the
police and judiciary, in ways that would now be considered
unthinkable if directed towards someone with paraplegia, or, perhaps
even more strikingly, towards someone from a racial minority [20].
Normalisation and an assumption of wider capability remain a distant
aspiration for many who have become identified as one with a “mental
health problem”, even though other previously marginalised
groupings now expect to enjoy them.
The anxiety provoked by a particularly distressing, threatening or
seemingly self-destructive person also leads to a search for expert help.
Most who come into contact with mental health professionals and
acquire the identity of someone with a mental health difficulty will
have done so via a route which began with troubling behaviour that
had caused others sufficient concern to seek professional help on their
behalf, or oblige them to seek it [21]. The point at which
understandable emotional distress, such as bereavement or romantic
disappointment becomes “mental illness” is commonly determined
not so much by the form it has taken, but by the extent to which the
sufferer’s immediate support network is able to accommodate the
resulting difficulties. Once health care professionals are engaged in
assisting with a distressed or confused individual it is but a short step
for them to take before being conferred the identity of one with a
mental health problem, and the labelling that goes with it. As
happened in response to Colin’s assumed spinal disability, the
experience of a troubled person who has sought or who has felt obliged
to seek professional help is frequently one of becoming unjustifiably
identified as incompetent, untrustworthy, a source of shame and
dependent upon patronising support. This commonly occurs quite
independently of the nature of their difficulties. Instead it is a direct
reflection of common, prevailing discourse concerning strong
emotional or psychological reactions.
Many of these consequences can be viewed as a result of applying or
assuming the classic sick role framework [22]. The “patient” is
incapacitated in a way that may benefit from expert attention, they are
relieved of responsibility but lose autonomy, they are obliged to
submit to treatment, and the situation is considered to be short term.
Williams [23] has provided a useful commentary upon the strengths
and weaknesses of this classic description when applied to conditions
that do not conform to this stereotype and Middleton [24] a comment
upon the weaknesses of applying it to mental health difficulties.
Central to both of these is the expectation that professional input may
be productive and has something to offer that other sources of support
do not. The authority to engage the constraints of the sick role
framework is only legitimate if doing so will lead to the beneficial
application of specialised knowledge and skills. When this does not
apply, the constraints of the sick role framework can bring more harm
than good, particularly, as we have argued, in the case of mental health
difficulties. What might be learned from the journey taken by the
Disability Rights Movement through the twentieth century is that
many with conditions that were not going to alter significantly as a
result of specialised, professional intervention, had more to gain by
eschewing the sick role than they had by embracing it. What is also
becoming apparent is that the same is true in relation to mental health
difficulties. Despite half a century of intensive biomedical research,
contemporary medical treatments for depression and psychosis are no
more effective than their 1950s predecessors. There is still no
understanding of why they work when they do, and many now
attribute much of their efficacy to an enhanced placebo effect [25]. Put
under the spotlight of extensive review and meta-analysis, the efficacy
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of psychological treatments appears to reflect more the ability of the
therapist to form a supportive alliance with their client, than it does
any specific technical skill they might bring to the consulting room
[26,27]. When someone with mental health difficulties does respond to
treatment it is probably more as a result of a healing relationship,
(which may have included the administration of a medicine they had
faith in), than because the health care professional did something
“expert”.
Layard’s therapeutic approach fails to take this complexity into
account, and as a result could be causing unintended harm. By
conceptualising unhappiness as something that a therapist can
alleviate; he frames it as something amenable to professional
intervention, and in so doing (perhaps unwittingly) consigns the client
to certain aspects of the sick role, which, as we have outlined, can have
particularly adverse consequences in a mental health setting. There is
no known data that might link this proposition to the lack of impact
IAPT has had upon sickness benefit claims and antidepressant
prescription rates, but the presence of this facility, framed as it is, does
confirm the view that emotional difficulties, and therefore by
association, unhappiness, are an illness to be treated by professionals.
That is not a position that would generate many successful para-
athletes.
Finally, Layard’s position, that happiness is something that can be
achieved by instrumental professional intervention is emphasised by
his choice of psychotherapeutic technique. IAPT provider
organisations have been explicitly instructed to focus upon making the
available therapy Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT). This is a form
of psychotherapy pioneered by Aaron Beck in the 1960s and could be
(crudely) described as a form of internal monologue. By teaching
people to identify their negative thoughts and replace them with
positive ones, cognitive therapists try to enable people to master their
emotions. The basic concept is not new. Aristotle first pointed out that
emotions both influence and are influenced by the thoughts we have.
By eliminating thoughts that promote bad moods and to encourage
thoughts that foster pleasant emotions, people gain a measure of
control over their emotional state and lift themselves out of depression
or anxiety by will power. Cognitive therapy teaches specific techniques
for identifying and removing negative thoughts. When used by a
trained therapist it can be as effective in treating depression as drugs
such as Prozac. However we wonder whether most of the efficacy
attributed to CBT is not due to the advice of the therapist, but more
the expression of empathy that the sufferer experiences. Historically
there may have been political reasons for Layard’s expressing an
interest in CBT. By virtue of the very fact that it is a particularly
instrumental approach to psychological therapy, it is also particularly
amenable to evaluation by conventional medical-style, clinical trials.
An idealised CBT therapist addresses identifiable difficulties the client
is suffering using an identifiable technique, and so it is notionally
possible to measure the extent to which application of the technique
has led to desirable change. Although, as we will argue, this is
commonly a gross oversimplification of processes associated with
psychological change, it is a seductive framework which appeals to
those seeking cost-effectiveness from public services and those wedded
to the ideology of evidence based medicine. These financial and
bureaucratic considerations have undoubtedly influenced the form
IAPT has been obliged to take, and as a result obscured the notion that
empathic relationships are more important to the promotion of
happiness than technological interventions. This is something we will
develop in the following section.
Future Directions for Policy and Practice
Western Capitalist societies are characterised by a competitive and
hierarchical individualistic structure. Failure to compete successfully
and the absence of friendship networks can lead to an experience of
being socially denigrated or humiliated and endangers the identity of
human beings. This is leading to demands for `the right to be
esteemed and recognised’, particularly for those feeling vulnerable in
such a society [7].
A symptom of this is a huge rise in the incidence of depression and
other psychosocial problems. Seventy years ago depression as we know
it was too rare to be properly researched [28]. Today almost a quarter
of the population reports some experience of mental ill health, the vast
majority reporting depression and/or anxiety. 30% of initial
consultations at a GPs surgery are for depression or anxiety and this
increases to 50% of subsequent consultations. Well over 60% of people
attending GPs surgeries for such psychosocial problems are
sympathetically turned away as distressed, but not ill. But what fuels
this demand for services? Many GPs in a study undertook by Shaw
[21] stated that patients were looking for a `quick fix’ or a `magic
bullet’ or tablet that would make them happy. This is also the
background to the massive growth of the `psy-industries’ of
counselling and psychotherapy as the traditional coping mechanisms
of the church, the community and family have been eroded. One could
also argue that this is the context behind the huge rises in drug and
alcohol abuse in contemporary society. People are `buying into’ such
services in search of happiness and self-fulfilment, but such services
can only reconcile people to `what is’ and in doing so also renders self-
identity dependent upon those professionals. There is certainly a great
danger in just assuming a compensatory function through contact
with therapists. This would serve to reify the notion of friendship and
community support (by equating it with a particular type of emotional
support only). Whereas individualised therapy cannot replace the
friendship and support which are part of ad hoc social networks that
are often culturally specific and which form a part of our social
identity.
The belief that the defining feature of `the self’ is its vulnerability
informs much of the psychology of Western cultures. In this context
`recognition of the self’ implies acknowledging the condition and
experience of vulnerability. For the individual, the disclosure of
vulnerability has the status of a moral statement that invites social and
cultural affirmation. It encourages the establishment of suffering as a
measure of social virtue. That is why, with a decline of friendship
networks, it has become common for some people to define
themselves through a psychological or medical diagnosis [7,29].
The rise of `therapeutic demand’ which has arisen from a
breakdown of solidarity and community is becoming manifest in a
number of areas. For example research on stress at work has argued
that the massive increase in work related stress is related to the
breakdown of trade unionism and collective means of solving work
related problems [30], 2002. As trade union actions became
unacceptable problems became expressed through a bio-medical
idiom. Since the 1980s a more individuated workplace ethos has
fostered a climate where problems are readily medicalised. At a time of
existential insecurity, a medical diagnosis at least has the virtue of
definition. A disease both explains an individual’s behaviour and helps
to ratify a sense of identity. In other words, the medicalisation of
everyday life allows individuals to make sense of their predicament
and gain moral sympathy. It also represents a socially sanctioned claim
for recognition. As a consequence there is a demand from people to
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expand diagnosis in medicine to recognise their situation (eg ME,
Attention Deficit Disorder, Gulf War Syndrome, Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder, RSI as well as anxiety and depression). In doing this
people are `relieved of responsibility' for their behaviour as they
gain recognition. It is a search for identity and a valorisation of a
person’s individual difference through the claim for therapeutic status
- because therapy is seen as a vehicle to social affirmation. The
argument is that people are driven by a deep psychological need to be
recognised and affirmed and that some seek identity and recognition
in this way because they may not have the friendship or community
networks to otherwise achieve this in a competitive individualistic
society. In the absence of friendship and community networks,
therapy becomes a vehicle for such recognition. It is, however, ironic
that their identity may then become attached to its own social
exclusion because it is attached to social exclusion for its very existence
as identity [29]. Building on the argument above some commentators
have concluded that psychological therapies are themselves
problematic [7,29] and while we would agree with this in relation CBT;
we would argue that those psychological therapies developed from an
existential and humanistic theoretical framework offer exactly the
forms of help that are needed. Rather than an illness ideology which is
subject to the criticisms outlined above, these therapies need to offer a
different paradigmatic view of what it is to be human, how distress
arises and how it is best dealt with [31]. Rather than concern with
hedonic well-being their focus is on eudaimonic well-being and
helping people to make meaning in their lives in such a way that
recognises that distress arises not from biochemical abnormalities but
from problems that have their roots in distal social causes [32]. Rather
than offering interventions based on diagnosis and treatment for so
called psychiatric disorders these therapies disown the illness ideology
and instead offer a relational focus.
Increasingly, it is recognised that it is the qualities of the therapeutic
relationship rather than the techniques employed that is helpful
[33-36]. This is not in an attempt to replace missing social networks
but because it is understood that in non-threatening empathic
relationships, people are able to examine their own situations non-
defensively and work out the best solutions to their own problems. As
such, existential and humanistic therapies, specifically person-centred
therapies [37], deliberately set out to promote the agency of the client.
While recognising that the therapeutic industry has a role to play
and that there are psychological therapies consistent with our
sociological analysis because of their deliberate focus on the agency of
the client, we return to the main argument that people’s problems in
living are not best addressed reactively if the cause ultimately resides in
distal social factors. As such, we would argue that as well as enhancing
the availability of psychological therapies to help people once their
problems of unhappiness have developed it would be logical to address
issues before they arise. A first step to achieving happiness and
improving mental health in society may be to try and re-establish the
anchors of community in people’s everyday lives (`Connecting’ is one
of NEFs 5 ways to wellbeing [17]) and dealing with the socio-
economic inequalities that give rise to mental distress. This would beg
a wider range of questions such as what are the various ways in which
social networks provide support functions and what may be missing in
an individual’s life and then what is it that therapy can offer? To
answer this question we can turn to recent developments in positive
psychology which have shown that well-being arises in circumstances
where people have their basic psychological needs met. Building on
Maslow’s original work on needs, it is now widely accepted that people
have basic psychological needs for autonomy, competence, and
belonging [38,39]. When these needs are met, psychological well-being
can be achieved.
In conclusion, we have argued that before any attempt is made to
try and `compensate’ for breakdowns in friendships and social
networks that one should consider the various aspects of friendship in
order to try and specify what one would aim to achieve in terms of
therapy. Therapies such as person-centred therapy that actively
address peoples’ problems from an understanding that their mental
distress is a result of their basic psychological needs not being met are
potentially valuable. However, even such therapies as these only serve
to condone the inequalities and injustices that give rise to mental
distress in the first place if they are implemented instead of social
change [40]. Thus, rather than waiting to address problems reactively,
we need to understand how public policy serves to either facilitate or
undermine peoples’ basic psychological needs in order to proactively
prevent mental distress from arising in the first place.
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